Being Somewhere

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xii

   PDF

2. Self-Representation

   • Ferdinand Pöhlmann

   Pages 1-60

3. Action

   • Ferdinand Pöhlmann

   Pages 61-137

4. Empirical Evidence

   • Ferdinand Pöhlmann

   Pages 139-215

5. Egocentric Space as Self-Representation

   • Ferdinand Pöhlmann

   Pages 217-250

6. Back Matter

   Pages 251-269

   PDF

Ferdinand Pöhlmann argues that a sense of one’s own basic abilities to move is a constitutive condition on the ability to perceive the world spatially. This constitutive relation explains why egocentric spatial representation is to be regarded as a kind of self-representation. In arguing for these claims, conceptual as well as empirical questions are discussed and an overview of accounts that take action as a constitutive condition on spatial representation is given. The picture that emerges is linked to the phenomenological (Scheler) as well as to the analytic (Evans) tradition in the Philosophy of Mind.​

• Disposition for Action
• Sensory Substitution Devices
• Inverted Vision
• Two Visual Systems Hypothesis
• conscious experience
• Kinaesthesis
• Phenomenology

• Stuttgart, Germany

  Ferdinand Pöhlmann

Ferdinand Pöhlmann received his doctorate from the Philosophy Department at Eberhard Karls Universität, Tübingen. He is currently working in the editorial office of a global publishing company in Stuttgart.

Policies and ethics