Rationality, Time, and Self

1. Front Matter

   Pages i-xii

   PDF

2. Introduction

   • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

   Pages 1-9

3. Indexicals and Rationality

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 11-11

      PDF

   2. Tense & Emotions

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 13-37

   3. Indexicals & Actions

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 39-64

4. Rationality

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 65-65

      PDF

   2. Reasons

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 67-90

   3. Acting for a Reason

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 91-119

   4. Rationality

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 121-142

5. The Reality of Tense and Emergence of the Self

   1. Front Matter

      Pages 143-143

      PDF

   2. The Argument from Rational Action

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 145-168

   3. Implications for Non-indexical Cases

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 169-202

   4. The Argument from Appropriate Emotions

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 203-230

   5. Time and Self

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 231-252

   6. Closing Remarks

      • Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

      Pages 253-265

6. Back Matter

   Pages 267-273

   PDF

This book provides a new argument for the tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This argument derives in part from theories which establish our nature as rational and emotional beings whose behavior is responsive to reasons which are facts. It is argued that there must be reasons, hence facts, that can only be captured by tensed and/or first-personal language if our behavior is to be by and large rational and appropriate. This establishes the tensed theory of time and emergentism or dualism about the self, given the physical body can plausibly be fully described non-first-personally. In the course of this discussion the book also clarifies and defends a notion of fact and responds to McTaggart’s paradox and Wittgenstein’s private language argument.

• Emotion
• Externalism
• Mind
• Metaphysics
• Ethics
• tensed
• tenseless

“In this lucid and thorough book, Olley Pearson argues that reasons, including motivational reasons are facts rather than beliefs. Moreover, they are indexical facts (involving I and now). He infers a tensed theory of time and emergentism about the self. This is a serious challenge to widely held theories. I highly recommend it.” (Peter Forrest, Adjunct Professor of Philosophy, School of Humanities, University of New England, Australia)

• Department of Philosophy, Durham University, Durham, United Kingdom

  Olley (F.O.C.H.) Pearson

Olley Pearson is currently Teaching Fellow in the philosophy department at Durham University, UK, where he was previously a Research Fellow. He has published papers on various topics including the nature of time, the emotions, the first person, and emergence.

Policies and ethics